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ABSTRACT
We empirically characterize the mechanics of trade adjustment during the Argentine crisis using detailed
transaction-level customs data covering the universe of import transactions during 1996-2008. Though
imports collapsed by nearly 70 percent from 2000-2002, the entry and exit of firms or products at the
country level (the "extensive margin") played a small role in this adjustment. By contrast, the within-firm
churning of inputs (the "sub-extensive margin") played a sizeable role, and we highlight significant
heterogeneity in how firms adjusted their import mix. Motivated by these facts, we build a model of
trade in intermediate inputs with heterogeneous firms, fixed import costs, and roundabout production
to evaluate the channels through which a collapse in imports affects productivity and welfare. Import
demand is non-homothetic and therefore the implications for productivity and welfare depend on the
details of individual firm adjustments and cannot be summarized by the change in the aggregate import
share. We simulate an imported input cost shock and show that these mechanisms can deliver quantitatively
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Large crises such as the Mexican crisis in 1994{1995, the East Asian crisis in 1997{1998, and
the Argentine crisis in 2001{2002 are characterized by large exchange rate depreciations and
collapses in imports. The dollar value of Argentina's imports, for instance, dropped by 69
percent between 2000 and 2002. A second feature of these episodes is the large decline in
real GDP and total factor productivity (TFP). Sandleris and Wright (2011) document an 11
percent decline in TFP of continuing manufacturing plants in Argentina between 2000 and
2002.1
In this paper we do two things: First, we empirically characterize the mechanics of
trade adjustment at the rm- and product-level during the Argentine crisis. Our analysis
makes use of detailed rm-level customs data covering the universe of import transactions
for Argentina during 1996{2008, a period that includes a dramatic nominal exchange rate
depreciation and trade balance reversal. Second, motivated by the empirical evidence, we
develop a model of trade in intermediate inputs with heterogeneous rms, xed import costs,
and roundabout production to evaluate the channels through which the collapse in imports
aects welfare and a welfare-relevant measure of TFP in manufacturing.
In the trade literature there is extensive empirical analysis of the impact that permanent
shocks such as trade liberalizations have on the extensive margins of adjustment|either
via changing the allocation of resources across rms (Melitz, 2003) or via changing product
varieties (Krugman, 1980). This paper empirically evaluates how important these various
forms of extensive margin adjustment are at business cycle frequencies, particularly in the
context of a large crisis.
We establish the following facts about the collapse in imports during Argentina's crisis.
First, the number of rms that exit the import market is large, but when weighted by value
these exits explain a small share of the total decline in imports. The number of importing
rms dropped from over 15,000 to less than 7,000 over the rst four quarters of the crisis and
did not return to its pre-crisis level for about ve years. However, the net contribution of rm
entry and exit explains less than 8 percentage points of the 69 percent decline in imports
1Meza and Quintin (2006) document that TFP declined by 8.6 percent in Mexico in 1994, by 15.1 percent
in Thailand, and by 7.1 percent in South Korea during the East Asian crisis.
1during the crisis. The pattern is similar for the number of imported product varieties.
The number of distinct 10-digit Harmonized Tari Schedule (HTS) product codes imported
dropped from approximately 13,000 to 10,000 over the same period and also took about ve
years to recover. Product entry and exit, though, explains between 0 and 15 percentage
points of the decline depending on the denition used. These ndings hold when looking at
the quarterly or annual frequency, when looking at normal times as well as during the crisis
and recovery, and when separately considering each end-use category.
The reason for this result is the high degree of concentration in international trade among
a small number of key rms and sectors. The largest 5 percent of importing rms contribute
approximately 85 percent of Argentina's imports and generally do not change their import
status after the crisis.2 Similarly, the largest 5 percent of imported 6-digit HTS categories
together account for about 60 percent of imports and are rarely dropped from the set of
aggregate imports.
However, trade in most countries, including Argentina, consists primarily of intermediate
inputs. It is therefore important to examine what happens to the bundle of imports at the
rm level as opposed to the country level. Even if a particular input variety continues to be
imported into the country, it may still be the case that several rms stop importing it and
thereby experience changes in their unit costs of production.
As an illustration, Figure 1 shows sample import activity for two large Argentine in-
dustrial manufacturing companies, both among Argentina's top 50 importers: BGH S.A.
and Siderca S.A.I.C. Both companies imported heavily in key intermediate input categories
before the crisis, but stopped importing these inputs during the crisis.3 These products
disappeared from the import bundle of these two companies, but this absence would not be
observable in aggregate data because other Argentine rms continued to make purchases in
all of these categories during the same period. Further, while these two companies stopped
2As discussed below, we can rule out the possibility that the largest importers are simply huge distributors
or import/export brokers.
3BGH imported industrial cooling fans and anti-vibration materials, largely from Motorola, during most
quarters in 2000 and 2001. With the onset of the crisis and after the exchange rate shock, imports of those
goods dropped to zero for six quarters, only to return in late 2003. Siderca, after importing more than
$2 million of tools for steel-cutting lathes in 2001 and spending more than $200,000 on imported tools for
aluminum smelting and mixing, exited those import markets completely in 2002 and early 2003. By late
2003, they returned to importing in those sectors and by 2004 spent almost $9 million on those imported
goods.
2importing these particular inputs, neither company would appear in aggregate extensive
margin calculations because they continued importing at least some other product during
the crisis. More generally we document that many imported products which are dropped
by a clear majority of importers are not considered to be dropped varieties at the aggregate
level because a minority of rms continue to import them. A product only contributes to
the extensive margin at the country level if all importers of that variety happen to decide to
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(b) Siderca S.A.I.C.
Figure 1: Sample Quarterly Product Imports for Two Large Argentine Firms
This observation leads to our second empirical nding: Within-rm changes in the mix of
imported varieties and supplier countries, regardless of whether other importers drop those
same varieties, play a signicant role in trade adjustment. This within-rm extensive margin,
or \sub-extensive" margin, explains up to 45 percent of the 69 percent decline in imports
between 2000 and 2002.
Third, we nd that the way importers adjust their imports varies with the size of the
rm. The extensive margin, when a rm exits trade entirely, is the most prevalent margin of
external adjustment for the smallest rms. Among continuing importers, the sub-extensive
margin becomes less important as the size of the importer grows. The largest rms adjust
primarily by reducing|but not dropping|their imports of particular products, which we
call the sub-intensive margin. The largest pre-crisis importers exhibited smaller percentage
declines in their import volumes.
3Fourth, we estimate the impact of sub-extensive margin adjustment on unit costs under
the assumption of a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function. If inputs
are imperfect substitutes, a drop in the number of imported varieties used will raise rms'
unit costs of production. In the absence of rm-level data, one would conclude that the
impact on unit costs of the import bundle arising from dropped varieties is close to zero.
Our rm-level data, by contrast, imply that this unit cost increased by up to 13 percentage
points for a typical importer due to the sub-extensive margin.
We next develop a model that matches these four features of the micro data. The goal
is to understand the implications for welfare and productivity of our empirical ndings.
We consider a monopolistically competitive industry with rms that dier in terms of their
technology, pay xed costs for importing varieties, and use each other's output as inputs
giving rise to round about production. The intermediate input aggregator in the production
function displays a \love of variety" feature with inputs being imperfectly substitutable as in
Ethier (1982). The presence of xed import costs implies that rms with better technology
will import more varieties, devote a larger fraction of their intermediate input spending to
imported inputs, and have a lower relative unit cost of production in excess of that implied
by their superior technology.
Owing to the non-homothetic nature of import demand, we show that the impact on ag-
gregate productivity and welfare will depend on the details of the individual rms' responses
to a shock and cannot be summarized by the change in the aggregate import share. As
rms dierentially adjust along the sub-intensive and sub-extensive margins their unit costs
of production are dierentially aected, leading to changes in relative market shares. It is
therefore not the case that the change in aggregate import share equals the weighted sum of
changes in rm-level import shares.
We then quantitatively evaluate the implications for welfare and productivity of an im-
ported input cost shock calibrated to match our empirical ndings for Argentina. Motivated
by these ndings, we ignore the entry and exit of rms. The simulation generates move-
ments in the sub-extensive and sub-intensive margins, and it reproduces the relationships
between these margins and rm size that are observed in the Argentine data. We calibrate
the economic importance of the sub-extensive margin in our simulation to match measures
4of its importance in the rm-level data. The aects of the shock are sizable with welfare
relevant productivity declining by nearly 5 percentage points.
In the absense of rm-level data, one might ignore heterogeneity in trade responses across
rms and conclude that dropped input varieties were not an important part of adjustment.
We therefore compare our benchmark simulation to a calibration of our model without xed
costs, as one might choose if guided only by aggregate data. We show that the implications
for welfare and productivity are meaningfully dierent.
The mechanism through which productivity is impacted is as follows. The imported input
cost shock causes each rm's unit cost of production to rise as it cuts back on imports of
intermediate inputs. The size of the impact depends on the elasticity of substitution among
and between domestic and foreign varieties, expands with the share of intermediate inputs
in production, and is amplied due to roundabout production. This in turn raises the price
of, and reduces demand for, each rm's output relative to sectors that do not use imported
inputs. The rm scales down its production, hiring less labor and capital, and reduces the
intensity of its intermediate input use, both of which generate declines in welfare relevant
productivity in our environment because rms set prices at a markup over marginal cost and
operate at an ineciently low scale. As shown in Basu and Fernald (2002), in the presence
of intermediate inputs, even when markups are small, the impact on productivity can be
sizeable. Finally, the decline in varieties of imported inputs imply savings in terms of labor
used for xed costs and this has a countervailing positive impact on productivity.
In addition to the eects described above, measured productivity is impacted by the mis-
measurement of the import price index. Standard national accounting practices, including
those used in Argentina, estimate real imports using a \matched-model" price index that
ignores changes in varieties. If inputs are combined with a constant elasticity of substitution,
this practice would underestimate the increase in input prices, thereby increasing imputed
real intermediate input use and decreasing measured TFP.
There clearly were many other negative shocks that impacted TFP during the Argen-
tine crisis. The time-series pattern for TFP, imported input use, and sub-extensive margin
adjustments, however, do oer corroboration that the mechanisms highlighted in our paper
may well have been salient for TFP in Argentina over this period. The share of input spend-
5ing on imports and the importance of dropped import varieties moved together with TFP
both in the period of economic decline and recovery. We focus on Argentina due to the avail-
ability of long-dated and detailed transaction-level data surrounding an acute sudden stop
and exchange rate shock. Our analysis, however, has broader relevance and can help answer
the question of how trade adjusts and the impact this adjustment has on the macroeconomy
during business cycles and crisis episodes.
Related Literature
This paper relates to many literatures. First, it relates to the literature that empirically
characterizes the margins of trade adjustment and is consistent with the ndings of Bernard,
Jensen, and Schott (2009) and Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2009) who use U.S.
data to document that the rm and aggregate product extensive margins are small while
the sub-extensive margin is large.4 Distinct from their analysis we focus on a dramatically
larger trade adjustment episode using the Argentine experience and specically evaluate the
implications of these ndings for welfare and productivity.
Second, it is related to the literature that evaluates the impact of imported interme-
diate inputs on productivity. See, for instance, Amiti and Konings (2007) and Goldberg,
Khandelwal, Pauvcnik, and Topalova (2009) for the impact of liberalization and increased
trade in Indonesia and India, respectively. Halpern, Koren, and Szeidl (2009) use Hungarian
rm-level data to document gains from improved access to imports when these imports are
imperfectly substitutable for domestic inputs at the rm level. Their measure of productiv-
ity gains is the decline in rms' unit costs (marginal costs) of production arising through
the sub-extensive margin. We evaluate the impact on a welfare relevant measure of produc-
tivity that diers from changes in unit cost, and we study the implications for aggregate
productivity of the various margins of trade adjustment.5
4Also see di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009) who argue that this nding can imply the welfare impact of
high entry costs on production is small.
5Broda, Greeneld, and Weinstein (2006) also evaluate the gains in unit costs in many countries brought
about by increased input varieties at the sector level from 1994{2003. Feenstra, Mandel, Reinsdorf, and
Slaughter (2009) consider the possibility that unmeasured gains in the terms of trade around 1995 contributed
to the measured productivity acceleration in the United States. Among other channels, they highlight the
failure of conventional price indices to account for the increase in varieties of traded information technology
products. Burstein, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2005) note, also in the context of the Argentine crisis, that
changes in price indices may be biased downward during large devaluations because households substitute
6Third, our work relates to research linking terms of trade shocks to productivity and
welfare. Kehoe and Ruhl (2008) argue that, under perfect competition, terms of trade
movements have no rst-order eects on productivity. This is not the case in our environment
since rms are price setters who charge markups. As is well known from Hall (1990) and Basu
and Fernald (2002), in the presence of markups, variations in the use of primary factors and
in the intensity of use of intermediate inputs will have a rst order impact on productivity.6
Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodriguez-Clare (2011) point out that in a broad class of models,
all that is needed to evaluate trade-induced changes in welfare is the observed change in
aggregate trade shares and an appropriate elasticity. The specics of rm-level adjustment do
not matter. On the contrary, in our setting the full distribution of import shares are needed
to evaluate aggregate eects on welfare and productivity. Further, there are economically
meaningful dierences between an environment with and without xed costs even when they
both generate the same change in aggregate import shares.
Lastly, our work is related to Sandleris and Wright (2011) and Neumeyer and Sandleris
(2010), which explore the impact of misallocation on TFP during the Argentine crisis and nd
that it plays an important role. We view our explanation for TFP decline as complementary
to the one proposed in these other papers.
2 Data
After eight years of growth averaging just under 6 percent per year, Argentina entered a
recession in 1999, with GDP, consumption, and investment all declining in real terms. The
recession worsened sharply in 2001:Q4, with real GDP ending 2002:Q1 more than 16 percent
below its level a year earlier. A large banking and currency crisis ensued and the Argentine
peso rapidly depreciated by nearly 200 percent relative to the U.S. dollar. Argentina's
dollar-denominated import price index was relatively stable, implying an upward spike in
toward lower-quality goods. Burstein and Cravino (2010) evaluate how trade liberalizations lead to increases
in real GDP if price indices partially capture reductions in taris.
6Ghironi and Melitz (2005) highlight the impact of rm entry and exit decisions on business cycle mo-
ments. Mendoza and Yue (2009) explore quantitatively the impact of imperfect substitutability between
domestic and imported intermediate inputs coupled with a worsening of the terms of trade on the ampli-
cation of nancial shocks.
7peso-denominated import prices that resulted in a 69 percent drop in dollar imports from
2000 to 2002.7
We now describe the data we use on rms and trade transactions during the Argentine
crisis. We bring together three datasets, starting with two datasets containing Argentine
customs data provided by private vendors called Datamyne and Nosis. We combine these
data with operating and nancial information on the largest Argentine rms, available from
the Capital IQ database.
2.1 Detailed Trade Data from Customs
Our data are collected from import and export shipping manifests by the customs agency
in Argentina and are publicly released. The data vary somewhat in coverage over time,
but give detailed information for each trade shipment, generally including the name of the
importer or exporter, the date of declaration, the source or destination country, the quantity,
weight, price, and value of the good, along with detailed information at levels at least
as disaggregated as the 10-digit HTS classication.8 We obtained most of our data from
Datamyne, a private provider of these trade statistics that receives a daily electronic feed
from the customs authorities.9 Subject to the few exceptions detailed below, we obtained
data on all trade in goods for Argentina for the 1996{2008 period. We now describe the
imports and exports data in turn.
Figure 2(a) compares the total value of Argentina's imports in our dataset with the value
reported in the International Financial Statistics database provided by the International
Monetary Fund. The data line up extremely well, including at high frequency, with the
only exception being a period from mid-1997 to early 1999 when our data miss about one-
third of the imports because Argentine customs did not provide it to Datamyne. Further,
7There was a secular shift in import market shares away from U.S. and toward Brazilian exporters
from 1999{2006, but the crisis of 2001{2002 itself did not have an obvious impact on the import shares of
Argentina's trading partners.
8Argentina additionally adds its own code with an 11th digit and a letter (as the 12th character, A-Z) to
the HTS classication, so these products can often be easily distinguished at a 12-digit level.
9Though Datamyne does not add or edit any information on its own, it takes signicant measures to ensure
the information is fully and accurately transmitted from the customs authority. Moreover it is among the
few such data providers that has received International Standards Organization (ISO) certication, reecting
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(b) Argentina's Imports from the United States
Figure 2: Our Dataset Compared to Other Sources
we compare reporting on these ows to their counterparts in data collected by the Foreign
Trade Division of the U.S. Census Bureau. Figure 2(b) demonstrates that though some
discrepancies clearly exist, the basic patterns captured in the U.S. bilateral trade data are
also reected in our micro dataset.
Economy-wide, imports come from more than 100 countries, include more than 15,000
HTS codes, and often reect more than 100,000 dierent country and product code combi-
nations. The smallest importers may trade with only one partner, but some importers are
supplied by over 40 dierent countries and themselves import in nearly 900 categories. Table
1 lists these and related summary statistics for imports in 2000 and 2002.
The Datamyne data include the equivalent information on export transactions from 1996{
2008, though the exporter names are redacted from 2000 onward. This redaction was per-
formed by Argentina's customs authority and is not specic to the Datamyne data. To
overcome this problem, we merge the data from Datamyne with another dataset covering
the period subsequent to 2000 that we obtained from Nosis, a private vendor.10 Unfortu-
10Nosis combines their own market knowledge with an algorithm that compares export transactions for
the post-2000 period, when exporter names are not available, to earlier transactions that include the names
in order to generate a \probable exporter." For instance, if an export transaction in 2003 had similar port,
HTS, volume, and destination information as several of BGH's export transactions from the late 1990s,
the algorithm would likely list BGH as the exporter in 2003. The Nosis database does not contain tax
identication codes that we use as our rm identiers so we hired data analysts to use text-matching software
to link the two parts of our export data. We identify each rm by its CUIT, which is the company's tax
identication number. This is a more stable and reliable indicator of each rm than the \name" eld, which
is more prone, for example, to typographical errors.
92000 2002
# of Importing Firms 25,138 13,980
# of Supplier Countries
Economy-wide 135 130
Per Firm, median 2 1
Per Firm, maximum 44 36
# of Imported HTS Codes
Economy-wide 17,333 15,831
Per Firm, median 5 4
Per Firm, maximum 899 733
# of Imported Country X HTS Combinations
Economy-wide 115,724 80,781
Per Firm, median 6 4
Per Firm, maximum 2,067 2,176
Table 1: Import Summary Statistics
nately, the Nosis data omit rm identiers for a large share of the transactions in 2000 and
2001, so we cannot do the same analyses for exports as we do for imports.11
2.2 Capital IQ Database
We match the rm names in our trade data with the Capital IQ database so we can learn more
about the importers themselves. Capital IQ contains operating and nancial information on
about 4,500 rms in Argentina, including public, private, domestic, and multinational rms.
Our trade data include dramatically more rms, but given the concentration of trade and
Capital IQ information among the largest rms, we are able to match rms accounting for
60{70 percent of Argentina's imports.
Table 7 (found at the end of the paper) lists Argentina's largest 50 importers for the
period 1996{2008, along with their primary industry and primary sector, as reported in the
Capital IQ database.12 Seven of the largest eight importers, themselves responsible for a
11See Albornoz, Pardo, Corcos, and Ornelas (2010) for a related analysis of Argentine exports.
12We exclude Argentina's Central Bank, which is credited in the data with some import ows associated
with its extension of trade nancing. We had a research assistent ll in blank entries for companies' primary
sector and primary industry classications.
10bit less than 10 percent of total imports in a typical year, are all Argentine subsidiaries
of foreign automobile manufacturers. Outside of these seven, however, many industries are
represented with no obvious concentrations or patterns. Though most of the companies are
recognizably not trading rms or distributors, we formalize this analysis using data on the
primary industry of importing rms. The monthly share of imports by rms with primary
industry data that go to rms classied as \Distributors," \Food Distributors," \Healthcare
Distributors," \Technology Distributors," or \Trading Companies and Distributors" ranges
from about 3 to 8 percent. These percentages are fairly stable throughout the dataset.
3 Empirical Findings
In this section we report our main empirical ndings. We show that the large decline in
aggregate imports during the crisis is explained primarily by declines from continuing im-
porters and has little to do with the entry and exit of rms into and out of import status.
The adjustment in trade takes place within rms at what we call the sub-intensive and
sub-extensive margins as rms both reduce the import value of each continuing variety and
reduce the number of imported varieties. Firms typically dier, however, in their decisions of
which varieties to drop, with one rm dropping a variety and another continuing to import
that same item. As a result, our rm-level data reveal that the product extensive margin is
an important source for adjustment, but an analysis of aggregate data would conclude it is
insignicant.
Additionally, we show that the relative importance of the extensive, sub-extensive, and
sub-intensive margins varies with rm size, and the import volumes of larger importers
decline proportionately less than those of smaller importers. Finally, we show that if inputs
are imperfect substitutes, within-rm sub-extensive margin adjustment impacts the unit
cost of production for rms. Taking this into account, we calculate that the unit cost of the
typical import bundle increased up to 13 percentage points more than what one would infer
based only on information contained in aggregate data. We describe in detail the ndings
below.
Finding 1: Dened as the entry and exit of rms or the entry and exit of
11products at the country level, the \extensive margin" plays a small role in
understanding trade adjustment during the crisis.
Total dollar imports declined by 69 percent from 2000 to 2002. We rst evaluate what
fraction of this decline is explained by rm entry and exit into and out of import status and
similarly what fraction is explained by the entry and exit of products into the import bundle.
Figure 3 shows the number of importers and number of imported 10-digit HTS categories
for 1996{2008, excluding the period in the late 1990s when the data are incomplete. We
nd that the number of rms that imported any goods in each quarter dropped by more
than one-half and the number of imported product categories dropped by nearly one-fourth.
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Figure 3: Number of Importing Firms and Products
































where vi;t is rm i's total (fob) spending on imports, 	t is the set of all importing rms in
period t, vt =
P
i2	t vi;t are total imports in the economy, and vt = vt   vt 1. The rst
term on the right hand side of Equation (1) is the intensive margin and captures the change
in imports from continuing importers. The second term is the extensive margin and captures
the volume of imports from new importers net of the volume lost from those that stopped
importing in period t. Figures 4(a) and 4(b) show, for denitions of t as quarters and as
years, the breakdown of aggregate movements in trade by intensive and extensive margins.
In aggregate trade ows a small share of changes is attributable to the entry or exit of
rms. For example, imports in 2002 were 69 percent below their already depressed levels
in 2000 and these ows were generated by about half as many importing rms. However,
the contribution to the 69 percent decline from the rm extensive margin was less than 8
percentage points.
We can do the equivalent exercise for products, where we use the same disaggregation
(1), but redene 	t to be the set of all imported product categories in period t. Figures
4(c) and 4(d) use the 10-digit HTS denition, and Figures 4(e) and 4(f) dene goods as the
interaction of the 10-digit HTS code and exporting country. Argentina implemented HTS
revisions in 1996/1997 (though it is unclear which month), May 2002, and May 2007. This
series of revisions potentially introduces an upward bias in our calculation of the extensive
margin's importance. We use the concordance in Pierce and Schott (2009) to attempt to
solve this problem, but can only apply this procedure for the 6-digit HTS codes. Pierce and
Schott base their concordance on U.S. data, and 6-digits is the most disaggregated level at
which the codes are internationally comparable. These adjustments make little qualitative
or quantitative dierence. As with the extensive margin of importers, the quantitative
importance of the extensive margin of imported products is small.13 (One exception is 1997,
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(f) HTS 10 X Country (Annual)
Figure 4: Various Extensive Margin Denitions by Quarterly and Annual Data
14when the changing code denitions clearly impacted the 10-digit disaggregation.)
Total % Intensive % Extensive
Firm -69% 0.89 0.11
HTS 6 -69% 1.00 0.00
HTS 10 -69% 0.92 0.08
HTS 6 X Cty -69% 0.91 0.09
HTS 10 X Cty -69% 0.79 0.21
Table 2: Intensive and Extensive Margins, 2000{2002
Table 2 summarizes these results and splits total trade adjustment for 2000-2002 into
intensive and extensive margins for varying product denitions. Very little trade adjustment
at business-cycle frequencies, even in the event of a large contraction in imports, is explained
by rm entry and exit or by product entry and exit at the aggregate level. This nding ex-
tends the ndings in Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2009) and Arkolakis, Demidova,
Klenow, and Rodriguez-Clare (2008) to characterize a dramatically larger trade adjustment.
Finding 2: The within-rm churning of inputs, which we call the \sub-extensive
margin," plays a sizeable role in aggregate trade adjustment.
We now consider changes in the mix of products imported by each rm, a margin we
call the sub-extensive margin. In contrast to the extensive margin of importers or goods at
the economy-wide level, this within-rm margin plays an essential role in aggregate trade
adjustment. This result is depicted in Figure 5, where the sub-extensive margin is dened
rm-by-rm and includes changes in imports for continuing importers due to newly imported
or newly dropped goods (dened, as above, in a variety of ways).14 We call the change in
imports of continuing importer-product combinations the sub-intensive margin.
Table 3 quanties the importance of these margins by listing the fraction of the 69 percent
overall decline in dollar imports from 2000 to 2002 as explained by the dierent denitions
to include all goods of rms involved in trade in a particular year. The exit of imported products is virtually
irrelevant for the long-term change in imports through the crisis | from late 1998 to early 2002 | and new
products explain at most about one-quarter of import growth from 2002 to late 2006. We have separately
generated these plots by good type and the pattern is very similar across 1-digit end-use categories.
14We omit separate plots of this disaggregation by end-use but have conrmed that the sub-extensive
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Figure 5: Sub-Extensive Margin
of the extensive, sub-extensive, and sub-intensive margins. Table 2 shows that whether the
extensive margin is dened as entering/exiting rms or products (whether HTS-6 or HTS-10)
at the country level, it explains little of the decline. By contrast, the sub-extensive margin
that captures within-rm changes in import categories explains a large share up to 45 percent
of the decline, depending on the product denition. Figure 5 shows that the sub-extensive
margin can explain more than 50 percent of adjustment at a quarterly frequency. This
is consistent with Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2009), who also note signicant
within-rm trade variety churning in U.S. data and conjecture that the welfare eect of
increasing product varieties is underestimated in country-level measures.
The importance of the sub-extensive margin (Finding 2) is consistent with the small
role played by the country-level extensive margin (Finding 1) because there is heterogeneity
16Total % Sub-Intensive % Sub-Extensive % Extensive
HTS 6 -69% 0.71 0.18 0.11
HTS 10 -69% 0.56 0.33 0.11
HTS 6 X Cty -69% 0.54 0.35 0.11
HTS 10 X Cty -69% 0.44 0.45 0.11
Table 3: Sub-Intensive, Sub-Extensive, and Extensive Margins, 2000-2002
across rms in the products imported. For example, imagine that before the crisis two
rms, Siemens Argentina and C.T.I., both imported the same semiconductor, but C.T.I.
stopped importing the chip after the peso depreciation. In this case, the country-level product
extensive margin would show no dropped products but there would be sub-extensive margin
adjustment capturing the elimination of C.T.I.'s semiconductor imports.
Figure 6 groups HTS 10-digit products into percentiles based on their size of imports dur-
ing the four quarters ending in September 2001, before the crisis.15 We exclude country-level
extensive margin products that were dropped from Argentina's aggregate import bundle.
The blue circles indicate the share of importer-product combinations in each of these per-
centiles that were dropped during the following four quarters. For any grouping of imported
products, somewhere between 60 and 75 percent of the rms that imported it before the
crisis stopped doing so subsequently. Many imported products which are dropped by a clear
majority of importers are not considered to be dropped varieties at the aggregate level be-
cause a minority of rms continue to import them. Perfect synchronization is required across
importers in terms of the products they add or drop for the product extensive margin to
show up at the country level.
Finding 3: Smaller importers typically experienced a greater percentage decline
in imports than larger importers. Further, the relative importance of the three
adjustment margins varies with rm size.
The pattern of trade adjustment varies with the size of the importer (as proxied by the
size of imports). Figure 7(a) divides rms into percentiles based on the size of their imports
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Figure 6: Dierent Firms Drop Dierent Products
in 2000.16 The largest buckets of importers had a smaller magnitude decline in their imports
from 2000 to 2002.17 This pattern holds within small and large importers and is driven in
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(b) Size and Margin of Adjustment, 2000-2002
Figure 7: Adjustment by Importer Size, 2000{2002
16Firms in the 25th/50th/75th percentiles had initial annual import volumes of about
$50,000/$210,000/$770,000.
17Figures 7(a) and 7(b) as well as the regressions in this section all omit the very small share of rms
(nearly all in the smallest 5 percentiles to the left of the plots) that exhibited an increase in imports of more
than 100 percent.
18To show this, we can decompose these trade declines into the three margins of adjustment.
Firms that stop importing altogether adjust along the extensive margin. The remaining rms
adjust using a combination of the sub-extensive margin, which is the dropping of imported
varieties (or addition of new ones), and the sub-intensive margin, which is the reduction (or
increase) in ows within a variety with continuing imports. Figure 7(b) plots the share of
each of these three margins in the adjustment of existing combinations of importing rm and
HTS 10-digit products pooled by the percentile of the rm's total imports in 2000 (our proxy
for size).18 A value along the y-axis equalling 1 for the extensive margin would mean that
all importers within that percentile exited trade in 2000. The prevalence of the extensive
margin clearly declines as rm size increases. Dierences between the sub-extensive and
sub-intensive margins are less stark, but the relative importance of the sub-intensive margin
is greatest among the very largest rms. Heterogeneity in the importance of these margins
underlies the heterogeneity in the degree of trade adjustment across rms of dierent sizes.19
The fact that the relative importance of the extensive margin and the magnitude of
changes in imports declines with size across essentially all sub-regions of the importer size
distribution suggests that this eect is not driven by industry composition or by the dierence
between multinationals and domestic rms. However, to test this more formally, we run a
series of regressions of the form:
b vi = 0 + 1 ln(vi;2000) + 2sector + 3MNC + "i;
where b vi is the growth of rm i's imports from 2000 to 2002, vi;2000 is the level of rm i's
imports in 2000, \sector" is a dummy variable that corresponds to the 10 dierent primary
sectors identied in the Capital IQ database, and \MNC" is an indicator for when the rm
is a multinational.20 We can only run this regression with the approximately 1,350 rms
18The plot ignores the small value of rm-product combinations that were added in 2002 relative to 2000.
19Some of these patterns are consistent with trade ows being innately lumpy as in Armenter and Koren
(2010). In our analysis below, it makes little dierence whether the patterns are generated by lumpiness or
by xed costs, so long as they generate heterogeneity in trade adjustment and cause rms to drop varieties.
20We are motivated by work such as Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004) in considering whether a rm is a
multinational since the ability to borrow through internal credit markets might plausibly have mattered
during this episode. Firms with headquarters in foreign countries are classied as multinationals. When a
rm's listed headquarters was in Argentina, research assistants looked in industry databases such as Hoovers
as well as company websites to try determine if any foreign operations existed. If so, we label the company a
19that match with the Capital IQ database in 2000. This set represents more than half of all
import ows, but the small number of observations rules out inclusion of more covariates. We
run this regression without dummies, with sector dummies, and with both sector dummies
and a dummy for multinationals. The sector dummies pick up a moderate amount of cross-
sector heterogeneity and the multinational dummy suggests that imports by multinationals
dropped about 7 percentage points less than domestic rms. However, the coecient on
size, 1, is positive and signicant at the 1 percent level in all three regressions.21
Finding 4: Assuming imported inputs are combined in a CES aggregator, the
scale of the rm-level extensive margin adjustment implies that the price of
the imported input bundle increased up to 13 percentage points more than the
increase implied by aggregate data.
As is well known, the ideal price index of a CES production function changes due to
both input prices and the number of input varieties. Let Mt be a CES aggregate of varieties
k 2 	t with prices pk;t that combine with an elasticity of substitution 1=(1   ). Following
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= b Pf MtFt; (2)
where vk;t is the spending on input k at time t and b Pf Mt is growth in unit costs that ignores
dierences in 	t 1 and 	t. Ft captures the impact on unit costs of a change in varieties.
It also equals the factor by which growth in a conventionally measured price index b Pf M will
dier from growth in the true index b PM.
The rst column of Table 4 lists the aggregate factor F calculated from aggregate data for
multinational. If no foreign operations were found, or if the company does not have a website, we label it a
domestic rm. If anything, this vetting errs on the side of having less multinationals. With this classication,
multinationals account for about three quarters of all imports of rms included in the Capital IQ database.
21We do note that these regressions are more sensitive to specication than would be suggested by Figure
7(a). This is because by including only the largest rms (which match with the Capital IQ database), we
signicantly limit the degree of size variation in the data and omit most extensive margin adjusters.
202000{2002 for various denitions of product variety and using an elasticity equal to 4, a value
near the middle of a relatively wide range of estimates found in a large literature.22 When the
extensive margin is dened at the country level without taking into account the within-rm
sub-extensive margin, F ranges from 0.992 to 1.012 percent depending on the granularity
with which we dene product categories. None of these corrections is meaningfully dierent
from 1. Consistent with our nding that very little trade adjustment is done via the country-
level extensive margin (Finding 1), the aggregate data suggest there is no meaningful impact
from dropped varieties on the cost of an imported input bundle.23
" = 0:75 F Weighted Average of Fi
Percentiles Included: all all (5,95) (20,80)
HTS 6 1.000 1.087 1.046 1.034
HTS 10 0.992 1.110 1.068 1.060
HTS 6 X Country 1.012 1.163 1.099 1.063
HTS 10 X Country 1.004 1.176 1.096 1.097
Simple Average 1.002 1.134 1.077 1.064
Table 4: Impact of Product Extensive Margin on Imported Input Costs, 2000-2002
Next, we use the information available in the rm-level data to calculate the impact of
the product sub-extensive margin on the cost to each rm of its imported input bundle.
The calculation is identical to that in Equation (2) but adding a rm index i to all val-
ues and yielding: b PMi;t = b Pf Mi;tFi;t. The second through fourth columns of Table 4 give
the trade-weighted average of rm-level factors Fi including all rms, after excluding the
top and bottom 5 percent of correction factors, and after excluding the top and bottom 20
percent of correction factors. We only include rms that had positive import ows in both
2000 and 2002. The impact of the product sub-extensive margin Fi diers somewhat across
specications, product denitions, and treatment of the outliers, but is always economically
22For example, Broda and Weinstein (2006) dene a product variety as the interaction of an HTS 10-
digit code and country and obtain a median elasticity estimate of 2.9 and a mean elasticity estimate of 8.2.
Eaton and Kortum (2002) generate an estimate of 8.28, Bernard, Eaton, Kortum, and Jensen (2003) give
an estimate of 3.6, and the estimate in Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2011) equals 4.87.
23This is similar to the nding in Arkolakis, Demidova, Klenow, and Rodriguez-Clare (2008) who evaluate
the eect of trade liberalization in Costa Rica on increased import variety over the period 1986{1992. They
nd that the gains from importing a larger variety of goods following the liberalization is small because
import spending is concentrated in a few products that were imported before liberalization. They estimate
the F to be 0.997 for consumer goods and 1 for intermediate goods.
21signicant. The average value in these columns ranges from 6.4 to 13.4 percent. Consistent
with Finding 2, under the assumption of a CES production function, sub-extensive margin
adjustment driven by within-rm input churning has a large impact on the cost of an im-
ported input bundle. In essence, rather than focusing only on the traditional terms of trade
measured at the country level, we show that one must focus on the rm-level terms of trade.
It is clearly the case that as the level of disaggregation increases more of the adjustment
will be classied as extensive or sub-extensive, so a reasonable question is what is a meaning-
ful level of disaggregation for this exercise? Previous quantication of the product extensive
margin, as in Broda and Weinstein (2006), Broda, Greeneld, and Weinstein (2006), or
Arkolakis, Demidova, Klenow, and Rodriguez-Clare (2008) has been done at the country or
sector level. This categorization is appropriate under the assumption that all imports are
nal goods consumed by agents with homothetic preferences or are intermediates consumed
by a representative rm. In such a setup, if a good enters the country, it also enters the
representative consumer's consumption bundle or the representative rm's input bundle. By
contrast, our calculations assume that all imported goods are intermediates used only by
the importing rm. In the context of the above example, we assume Siemens' continued
semiconductor imports reects their continued use of the input in production, while C.T.I.'s
dropping of that particular input implies it is no longer using it in production.
In essence, we assume that when a rm does not import a variety it is not using that
variety in production. We believe this is generally the most appropriate assumption, but it
is violated if rms purchase inputs from a domestic distributor who imports it or if rms
draw down holdings of a particular input from inventory.24 As discussed above, the share of
imports due to distributors is low throughout the sample and in fact decreases during the
crisis, ruling out the rst concern.
To get a quantitative sense for the importance of the inventory mechanism for our mea-
surements, we would ideally like to condition rm import behavior on changes in their
inventories. Unfortunately, rm or detailed sector level data on inventories are not broadly
available for Argentina. As an alternative, we classify 6-digit HTS sectors based on the in-
24Alessandria, Kaboski, and Midrigan (2010) emphasize the importance of the inventory channel in trade
adjustment.
22ventory/sales ratio in the corresponding 3-digit NAICS manufacturing sector in U.S. Census
data from 2000. Figure 8 shows that if we separate sectors into groups with low, medium,
and high inventory intensities, we do see dierences in the decline in imports.25 For in-
stance, comparing 2002:Q1-Q2 with 2001:Q1-Q2, low inventory intensity imports dropped
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Figure 8: Inventory Intensity and Import Decline
These results show that ignoring inventories may lead to an overstatement of the change
in varieties used in production. For this reason, we focus on the 2000{2002 period. Given
that U.S. manufacturing inventories typically equal from 1 to 2 months of sales, this longer
period should alleviate the concern.
Finally, one might be concerned that the reduction of import varieties need not impact
production costs if there is a similar reduction in nal good varieties. For instance, if each
import variety is used by multiproduct rms to produce a single output variety, then the
reduction in imports can simply follow from a reduction in nal good varieties without
altering in any way the production of continuing goods (though this reduction will still
have welfare eects). The best evidence against such a hypothesis would be data on total
25The average monthly inventory to sales ratio in the three groups equals 1.2, 1.5, and 1.9.
23varieties produced, which we do not have. However, we can proxy for the number of varieties
available for domestic consumption by looking at the varieties exported from Argentina over
this period. Figure 9(a) shows that in the aggregate there is a small secular increase in both
import and export varieties from 2000 to 2008. Imported varieties, however, sharply collapsed
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(b) Import and Export Varieties at Firm Level
Figure 9: Export Varieties did not Decline Along with Import Varieties
Even stronger evidence comes from matching the imports and exports of the same rm
and regressing import varieties, export varieties, and their dierence, on time xed eects
after absorbing rm xed eects. The quarter xed eects from this regression are plotted
in Figure 9(b) and show that while the number of both import and export varieties have
a similar long-term growth rate from 1996 to 2008, they diverge dramatically during the
crisis, with rms importing far fewer varieties to support relatively stable numbers of export
varieties.27 This evidence suggests that it was not the case that all (or any) of the decline
in imported input varieties was accompanied by a reduction in nal good varieties.
In sum, the micro data indicate that dropped product varieties, the sub-extensive margin,
26Plots 9(a) and 9(b) have been seasonally adjusted by removing estimated quarter time-eects.
27As discussed in the data description, our economy-wide export data have large gaps before 2000, which
is why Figure 9(a) starts in 2000. Our rm-level export data are of lower quality before 2002:Q1, but if the
missing ows reect the omission of representative exporters in their entirety, rather than the omission of
some subsets of given exporters' shipments, then the xed eect regression in Figure 9(b) will be unaected.
At a minimum, the export series from 2002 onward and the entire import series in Figure 9(b) are uncorrupted
by data concerns. Even over this smaller region, the evidence suggests export varieties did not drop along
with import varieties.
24plays an important role in trade adjustment, a conclusion that could not be inferred from
aggregate data. In this sense, studying the micro data is important for thinking about the
appropriate model for trade in intermediate inputs. This in turn is important to estimate
the impact on productivity and welfare of trade shocks, something we turn to in the next
sections.
4 Multi-Input Firms, Trade, and Productivity
Consistent with Findings 1-4, we build a model where rms combine labor, capital, and a
continuum of imported and domestically sourced intermediate inputs to produce a unique
variety of good that is used both for nal consumption and as an intermediate input by
other rms. The intermediate input aggregator in the production function displays a \love of
variety" feature with inputs being imperfectly substitutable as in Ethier (1982). Firms dier
in their technologies and they pay a xed cost for each variety of input that is imported.28
This model generates both within-rm adjustment on the sub-extensive margin and het-
erogeneity in trade adjustment across rms. Firms with worse technology will not have
sucient scale to cover the xed costs of importing a larger number of varieties. Conse-
quently, rms will dier in the share of their spending on inputs that are imported. This
endogenously generates an additional source of variation in the unit cost of production across
rms, in addition to the exogenous technological dierences. We use the model to evaluate
the channels through which an imported input cost shock can aect manufacturing produc-
tivity and welfare. We show that these eects are sizeable and when calibrated to Argentina
can generate a productivity decline of nearly 5 percentage points.
The aggregate data misleadingly imply that dropped input varieties were not an impor-
tant part of adjustment and give no evidence of non-homotheticities in import demand. In
the absence of rm-level data, therefore, the most natural model of trade during the Argen-
tine crisis would omit xed costs. We compare our baseline model to this model and show
28Motivated by Finding 1, there is no xed cost for entry into import status and therefore rm entry and
exit will play no role in trade adjustment. We have performed calculations with a xed entry cost calibrated
to match the data and found little dierence with a model without xed entry costs in its implications for
productivity.
25that the implications for productivity and welfare are signicantly dierent.
4.1 Environment










where Xi is the intermediate input bundle, Ki is capital, Lp;i is the labor input used in
production, and Ai is the rm's exogenous technology. Xi combines a bundle of diverse
intermediate inputs produced domestically, Zi, and another bundle of imported intermediate



























zij represents rm i's use of domestically produced inputs j, 
i is the set of foreign input
varieties imported by i, and mik is the quantity of imported input k. The elasticity of
substitution 1=(1 ) is the same within domestic varieties and within foreign varieties, while
1=(1   ) is the elasticity of substitution between the bundles of imported and domestically
produced inputs.
The output of each domestic rm i is used to produce a nal good gi and as an interme-
diate input zi that is used domestically by other rms. This captures the roundabout nature
of production. There are no exports:














where 0 <  < 1 and 1=(1   ) is the elasticity of substitution across the dierent varieties
used in producing the nal good.29
There is a xed cost f denominated in units of labor that is an increasing function of
the measure of varieties imported. The presence of these xed costs is consistent with the
empirical evidence we presented earlier and the evidence in Bernard, Jensen, and Schott
(2009) and Halpern, Koren, and Szeidl (2009). Total xed costs can be written as:
F(j
ij) = f j
ij
 ;
where f > 0;  > 0. We denote the labor used to pay xed costs for rm i as Lf;i. This spec-
ication implies that all rms will import at least some positive quantities. Consistent with
Finding 1, rm entry into and exit from import status will not be important for aggregate
trade adjustment.
4.2 Firm's Problem
Firms engage in monopolistic competition. Each rm i chooses Ki, Lp;i, and the vector fzijg,
given the price of labor w, the rental price of capital r, and the set of domestic intermediate
input prices fpjg. They also choose the set of imported varieties 
i and the amount of each
variety k, mik.
We assume that the price of all imported goods is pm, and since all imported varieties are
identical, the quantity of each imported foreign variety will be the same, mi.30 The rm's
29For simplicity we assume that the elasticity of substitution across domestic varieties in producing good
j is the same as across domestic varieties in producing the nal good. This will imply that the elasticity of
demand faced by rm i is a constant equal to 1=(1 ): If the elasticities dier then the elasticity of demand
faced by rm i is a weighted average of the elasticity of the nal good demand and of the intermediate input
demand, where the weights reect the relative shares of output going to the nal demand sector compared
to intermediate input demand.
30We make this simplifying assumption because the main comparative static we consider is the eect
of the Argentine peso devaluation on import purchases. This large common shock likely dominated any
idiosyncratic movement in import prices.
































is the same for all rms, while the














diers across rms to the extent that they import a dierent measure of varieties j
ij. The
larger the measure of imported varieties used the lower the intermediate input cost index,
all else equal.
Firm i's demand for production workers Lp;i, capital Ki, domestically sourced inputs
fzijg, and imported inputs fmig are given by the rst-order conditions:
wLp;i = (1   )(1   )CiYi;
rKi = (1   )CiYi;















































where PG is the CES price index for nal varieties gi. The price set by rm i is pi = Ci=.
28Firm i then chooses 







where i are prots gross of all xed costs.
It follows that rms with better technology will import a larger measure of varieties
as long as the second-order conditions for an interior solution for 
i are satised.31 Since
varieties are homogenous the identity of each specic imported variety is indeterminate. The
model is then consistent with rms dropping disjoint sets of varieties that do not show up
in the aggregate, as was the case in the empirical evidence.
Dene i 
PZZi
PXiXi to be the share of domestic inputs in total spending on intermediates.




























and  = (1   )1  ((1   )1 )
1 .
The price index therefore depends on the joint distribution of rm-level technologies
Ai and import shares (1   i), which captures the heterogeneity in unit costs of production
arising from exogenous dierences in Ai and endogenous dierences in i. Since high Ai rms
have lower i they have lower unit costs of production. This cost advantage is decreasing
in the elasticity of substitution across domestic and foreign inputs, . The revenue, prots,
and value added will be more dispersed in this environment than in one without xed costs.












 1 < 0: This is satised
as long as  is suciently high. (PMi=PXi)

 1 equals the share of intermediate input spending on imported
inputs and therefore belongs to the interval (0;1).
295 Productivity and Welfare
The goal of this section is to evaluate the impact of a foreign input cost shock on the
productivity of the manufacturing sector and the resulting implications for the welfare of
a representative agent in the economy. We follow Basu and Fernald (2002), Basu, Pascali,
Schiantarelli, and Serven (2011), and Sandleris and Wright (2011) and derive a generic
welfare-relevant measure of productivity.
In the appendix, we write the standard problem of an innitely lived representative
agent who maximizes utility from consumption and leisure subject to standard production
and savings technologies. If we set this problem in the context of the industry described in
Section 4, the impact on welfare of a one time (unanticipated) transitory shock is the sum









P V AY V A
denote rm i's share of industry value added and let
sLlnL =
P
i !isLilnLi, sKlnK =
P
i !isLklnKi, and lnY V A = !i
P
i lnY V A
i
denote the growth rates of labor, capital input, and value-added in the manufacturing sector,
where sLi and sKi are the shares of labor and capital in rm i's value-added and sL and sK
are the shares of labor and capital in industry-level value-added.32 Industry-level factor
shares multiplied by growth in industry-level inputs can be written as the value-added share
weighted sum of the corresponding rm-level object because all rms pay the same factor
prices. As shown in the appendix, the impact of a shock on welfare W in our economy,




V A   sLlnL   sKlnK

  sMlnPM (6)
= lnPR   sMlnPM;
where sM is the share of imports in industry-level value-added and lnPM = lnpm +
lnF is the trade-share weighted average of changes in the price of rms' import bundles.
As highlighted by Basu and Fernald (2002) the term in parentheses in equation (6) is a
\modied" Solow residual because the factor shares need not sum to one. We refer to it as
32If this expression corresponded to the aggregate economy, lnY V A would equal real GDP growth.
30the sector's \productivity" PR. Similarly, we dene lnPRi = lnY V A
i   sLilnLi  
sKilnKi, where we refer to PRi as \rm-level productivity." Given that each element of
equation (6) equals the value-added share weighted sum of the equivalent rm-level variables,
rm i's contribution to aggregate productivity growth is simply !ilnPRi. (By the same
argument we refer to !ilnWi as the rm's contribution to changes in welfare.)
The last term sMlnPM captures the direct negative impact on welfare of an increase
in imported input costs relative to domestic inputs. Recall that in standard trade models
such as those examined in Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodriguez-Clare (2011) where trade is
balanced and factors of production are inelastically supplied, all changes in welfare (absent
exogenous changes in technology) arise from changes in the terms of trade. In our analysis
of a single industry that does not export, the only term that arises is a negative term linked
to the change in the price of imports.33
5.1 Firm-level and Sector-level Productivity










Xi = (PXiXi)=(piYi) is the share of intermediate input spending in total revenues (as
opposed to in value added). Equations (4) and (5), together with the optimality of constant
markups, imply that sY
Xi =  for all rms. In the appendix, we follow steps similar to those
in Basu and Fernald (2002) with the distinction that we have labor that is used for xed


















lnLf;i + lnAi=(1   ): (7)
33Similarly, because our model is not dynamic, we omit here terms capturing the welfare impact through
changes in the valuation of industry assets.
31We write lnVi  sKilnKi + sLilnLi for the percent change in use of primary inputs
and use !Lp;i  Lp;i=Li to denote the share of rm i's labor that is used in production.
Equation (7) allows us to describe how a generic shock will impact rm-level productivity.
First, productivity will change with the scale of production lnVi since rms have pricing
power and  < 1 in our model. As emphasized in Hall (1988, 1990), if there is imperfect
competition in output markets, changes in primary factor usage will have a rst order impact
on productivity. With imperfect competition there is a wedge between the marginal rate of
substitution and the marginal rate of transformation of factors of production, so variations
in their usage, including those driven by import price shocks, matter for welfare.
Second, changes in the intensity of intermediate input use, lnXi lnYi, use will have
an impact on productivity when rms have pricing power for the same reasons as changes
in scale of production do. Importantly, in the presence of intermediate inputs,  > 0, even
small deviations from  = 1 will have signicant eects on productivity. In the next section
we relate changes in this term to changes in the share of intermediate input spending on
domestic inputs, i.
A third eect on rm productivity arises from changes in the use of labor for xed costs
lnLf;i. Equation (3) shows that xed labor has no direct eect on output. Therefore,
all else equal, a decline in its use has a positive impact on this welfare-relevant measure of
productivity.
Finally, the fourth term refers to changes in the technology Ai of each rm. We hold
technology xed by assumption and therefore shut down this last mechanism for productivity
changes.
It is clear from equation (7) that shocks to imported input costs will have a rst order
impact on rm productivity in our economy. This result diers from Kohli (2004) and Kehoe
and Ruhl (2008) who assume perfect competition and conclude that terms of trade shocks
have no rst-order eect on productivity. The dierence is that we consider the case when
rms have pricing power. In the limiting case of no pricing power when  ! 1 we also
obtain the result that there are no rst order eects on productivity. Even in this case of
price-taking rms and no rst order change in productivity, terms of trade shocks still matter
for welfare, as can be seen in the second term on the right hand side of equation (6).
32In the presence of xed costs there will be heterogeneous adjustments in each of the
rst three terms of equation (7). Because of dierential adjustments on the sub-extensive
margin across rms of dierent sizes, the change in PMi will vary across rms. This will
imply variation in changes in the unit cost of production and consequently on the scale
of production. In parallel, heterogeneity in sub-extensive margin adjustment will bring
heterogeneous adjustment in xed costs.
Next, we consider the impact on sectoral productivity of a common change in the cost
of imported inputs in our model, designed to capture the eect of a large nominal exchange
rate devaluation that increases the relative price of imported to domestically sourced inputs.
We adopt a partial equilibrium framework that holds factor prices (w, r) xed and write the













































(1   )lnpm: (11)
The rst term on the right hand side of equation (8) captures the overall scale eect on
productivity of the change in factor input use lnV 
P
i !ilnVi. The increase in foreign
input costs in our economy generates an increase in the unit cost of production for rms that
in turn raises the price of each rm's output relative to sectors that do not use imported
inputs. This reduces the demand for the industry and consequently generates a decline in
the usage of K and L. Firm sub-extensive margin adjustment also generates movement in
L by changing the use of labor associated with xed costs.
The next set of terms arise from heterogeneity in trade adjustment due to the interaction
34As discussed in the appendix, these expressions rely on the approximation ln(1   i) =  
i
1 ilni,
which is valid for small shocks. In the simulation section we do not use this approximation because we study
large shocks.
33of xed costs and heterogeneous technologies. The term in line (9) can in principle be positive
or negative and reects the impact of non-homothetic import demand. Because rms adjust
dierentially, the price of their output will adjust dierentially and market shares will change
endogenously (i.e. ln!i 6= 0). As discussed above, trade (or changes in trade) induces a
shift in market shares relative to the exogenous technology distribution. Lines (10) and (11)
capture the impact of adjustments in import shares across the entire distribution of rms.
It is useful to compare productivity and welfare in our baseline model to the case where
there are no xed costs in importing varieties. With no xed costs, each rm imports the
same foreign varieties and spends the same cost share on imports. Trade has the same impact
on all rms' unit cost of production and consequently the full distribution of market shares
!i remains unchanged in response to import cost shocks. Firms with dierent technologies
might operate at dierent scales but this heterogeneity is irrelevant for all aggregate mea-
sures. For example, lnVi is the same across rms. In this case expression (9) is equal to











i !ii is the industry average of intermediate input spending on domestic inputs.
This expression resembles the nding in Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodriguez-Clare (2011),
where primary factors are in xed supply and therefore lnV = 0. The impact of a change
pm is an increasing function of the share of intermediates in production , a decreasing
function of the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign intermediates , and
is summarized by this scaled movement in ln. In models where L and K are exogenously
xed and where there is no change in the market share of continuing importers, the impact
on productivity and welfare is a simple linear function of the percent change in spending on
domestic intermediate inputs.
In the case with xed costs and heterogenous rms, the terms (9), (10), and (11) do not
simplify and the impact on productivity depends on the full distribution of individual rm
responses. This is because, consistent with Finding 3, rms respond to the same shock with
a dierent share of their adjustment due to the sub-intensive and sub-extensive margins.
34Firms with more product sub-extensive margin adjustment see import volume decline more
than rms with more sub-intensive margin adjustment. Term (9) reects the dierential
changes in rm shares of value added and term (10) does not simplify because it is no longer
the case that the change in the aggregate import share equals the weighted sum of changes in
rm-level import shares. Also note that the coecient in expression (10) is always positive.
This in part reects the positive impact on productivity from the savings of xed cost labor
implied by the shift from foreign to domestic inputs.
5.2 Measured Productivity
In the previous sections we focused on the impact of an import collapse on productivity
and welfare under the assumption that the measurement of prices and quantities properly
accounted for changes in input varieties. As pointed out by Feenstra (1994), however, sta-
tistical agencies in all countries employ matched-model price indices which do not adjust
for changing import varieties. Therefore, if trade collapsed in part due to the product sub-
extensive margin, and if production involves CES aggregation as in our model, these agencies
would underestimate the true rise in import prices. If a matched model price index were
used to calculate Xi from the observed spending on inputs (PXiXi), it would result in an
overestimate of intermediate input use which would lead to a further decline in measured
productivity.
Under these assumptions, we write the measured change in productivity as:








where e PXi is the mis-measured price index that does not account for the change in the
varieties of imported inputs. This measurement implies a positive movement in (PXi=e PXi)
and a greater decline in actual than in measured productivity. In this sense, our rm-
level data reveal that dropped import varieties are not only important for understanding
the actual change in welfare-relevant productivity but are additionally important for the
practical measurement of this object.
The above analytical expressions suggest that important dierences in productivity and
35welfare emerge in response to the same shocks depending on the underlying structure of
the model. Our rm-level data and Findings 1-4 motivated the structure of our baseline
model presented in Section 4. In the absense of simulations of the baseline and any alternative
model, however, it is hard to determine when productivity will be higher or lower in response
to any given shock or if these dierences are signicant. We therefore turn now to simulations
to compare the outcomes for productivity and welfare in models with and without xed costs.
5.3 Simulation
We numerically simulate the model with a simple algorithm in which we specify the number
of domestic rms, the distribution of their technologies G(Ai), the xed cost function F(j
ij),
an initial value for the import price pm, and the set of parameters f;;;;b;;w;rg. To
allow for some substitution away from the manufacturing sector, we specify utility as a CES




additionally specify xed values for C, PN, and !. Equilibrium in this partial equilibrium
setup is simply the price of output and the number of imported varieties, fpi;
ig, such
that the rm's rst-order conditions are satised given nal demand in the economy. The
numerical algorithm used to solve for the equilibrium is detailed in the appendix.
5.4 Calibration
We now describe our calibration of the most important parameters used in our baseline
simulation, though we later report results for varying parameter values. We set  =  = 0:75,
corresponding to an elasticity of 4, the value used in Section 3. We choose  = 2=3, consistent
with the 1997 input-output table for Argentina obtained from the OECD.35 Table 5 lists these
as well as the other parameter values used in our benchmark simulation, which simulates an
industrial sector with 1,000 rms.
We can directly measure the share of input spending on domestic goods, , for 1997 from
the input-output table, but Argentina has not released a version for subsequent years. The
35The OECD input-output table contains 48 sectors of which we classify 21 as manufacturing. We nd sim-
ilar values for 1998{2002 using Argentina's annual manufacturing census (the Encuesta Industrial Annual).
The stability of this share corroborates our Cobb-Douglas functional form assumption.
36  b    f 
0.75 0.75 1 2/3 1/3 2 0.0075 0.8
w r C PN ! ppre
m b pm pre post
50 50 1x108 1 0.2 1.74 1.155 0.83 0.89
Table 5: Baseline Simulation Parameters
annual manufacturing census gives annual input spending by manufacturers, though, so we
can approximate  in future years by assuming that the growth in manufacturing spending on
imported inputs follows the growth in total imports.36 This results in a pre-crisis minimum
value of 0.83 for . We choose the distribution of technologies Ai such that the distribution
of import shares lines up well with what was observed in the data. The dotted red line of
Figure 10 plots the simulated import cdf, which is a close match with that in the solid blue
line plotted from the Argentine data in 2000.
Share of Total Imports
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Figure 10: Concentration of Imports in the Data (2000) and in the Simulation
We shock pm such that, given the values for PN, !, and , the share of manufacturing
input spending allocated to imported goods, 1   , decreases to 0.11, consistent with the
36We have also tried growing imported input spending by the import spending on capital goods, interme-
diate goods, fuels, and parts of capital goods as reported in Argentina's annual manufacturing census. The
results do not meaningfully change.
372002 value in our calculations with the Argentine data. We do not aim to explain objects
outside of the manufacturing sector, such as real GDP growth. As such, the values of PN,
!, and  are not important for our simulation other than their determination of the real
decline in manufacturing value added.37 Given these values and the shock to pm, the implied
reduction in manufacturing value added equals 13 percent, in line with the 12 percent decline
during the crisis in the industrial production index, obtained from Global Financial Data.38
5.5 Simulated Adjustment Patterns
We now simulate an import price shock in our model and report results in order to achieve
three goals. First, we wish to demonstrate that the model can reproduce Findings 2-4 (it by
assumption reproduces Finding 1). Second, we wish to evaluate the scale of productivity and
welfare changes brought about from the shock. Third, we use the simulations to demonstrate
the dierential response of our economy, which is designed to reproduce the large product
sub-extensive margin observed in our rm-level data, compared with an economy without
signicant extensive margin adjustments, as would be consistent with aggregate data.
Finding 1 documented that the rm extensive margin played little role and given there
is no xed cost of importing per se (only a per-variety xed cost), the rm extensive margin
plays no role in trade adjustment in our simulated model.39 Sub-extensive margin adjustment
in our model, however, contributes 47 percent of the simulated decline in exports, with the
remainder due to the sub-intensive margin. This compares with the sub-extensive margin
contributing 45 percent and the sub-intensive margin contributing 44 percent in the data,
as we showed in Finding 2. The sub-extensive and sub-intensive margins are comparably
important with each other in both our simulated model and in the data.
Finding 3 noted that larger rms (proxied by the size of their pre-crisis imports) exhibit
on average a smaller percentage decline in trade than do smaller rms and that the sub-
intensive margin played a greater role for larger rms. In the data this result is driven by
37For example, exogenously imposing a change in aggregate nal consumption C or changing the parameter
 would be isomorphic for the objects in the manufacturing sector we focus on.
38The Argentine national accounts lists a decline of 17 percent over this same period.
39We could, of course, easily add an initial xed cost to increase the role of the rm extensive margin.
Because these rms will be the smallest in the economy, this change would have no meaningful impact on
any other reported result.
38the reduced prevalence of extensive and sub-extensive margin adjusters among larger rms.
Figure 11 plots these moments of trade adjustment against importer size and conrms these
ndings hold in our simulated data. The dierences between large and small rms in these
respects are more muted in our simulation than in the data. This emerges in large part
because we have omitted the extensive margin in our model. If we introduced a xed
importing cost which generated the exit from trade among small rms, dispersion in these
gures would more closely resemble the magnitudes witnessed in the data.40










































(a) Scale of Trade Adjustment and Size
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(b) Margins of Trade Adjustment and Size
Figure 11: Adjustment and Size in Simulation
Figure 11(a) shows that larger rms in the simulation adjust less and Figure 11(b) shows
that a greater share of this adjustment for the largest rms comes from the sub-intensive
margin. In general the relationship between rm size and the elasticities of response to cost
shocks depends on the model's details, parameter values, and distributional assumptions,
discussed further in the appendix.41 In our simulation, rms with worse technology (smaller
size) have a higher i. A higher i on one hand increases the responsiveness to a shock of the
number of foreign varieties imported (because the rm with a higher i has a higher price
movement of PMi relative to PXi). On the other hand it lowers the responsiveness to a shock
40We also note that while only the smallest rms would adjust along the extensive margin in such an
exercise, any randomness (such as technology shocks) introduced to this environment would spread these
extensive margin adjusters across the size distribution.
41In Chaney (2008) the elasticity depends on the specics of the distribution function across imported
varieties. In the case of Pareto the elasticity is shown to be invariant to rm productivity. In our setup the
distribution is degenerate because all varieties are identical.
39of the optimal price and therefore demand, which in turn aects the demand for inputs. The







which is the case with our baseline parameters.
Finally, Finding 4 measured the implied change in the unit cost of each rm's CES import
bundle and found that a trade-weighted average of these changes ranged between 6 and 13
percent, depending on the denition of \variety" used. We calculate this identical object in
our simulation and nd a value of 8.8 percent, highly consistent with the empirical range.
This conrms that the economic impact of the simulated sub-extensive margin adjustment
also resembles that found in the rm-level data.
5.6 Simulated Baseline Declines in Manufacturing Productivity
Figure 12 shows how lni and lnPRi vary across the size distribution of rms. The
rms with the best technology import the most and are at the right of the plot. Their initial
i values were lowest and the percent increase in those values is greatest. This results in the
largest productivity decline for those rms.
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Figure 12: Changes in Domestic Input Share and Productivity
40We next provide estimates of sectoral level productivity in Table 6. Across the columns
we report four values for each simulation: lnPR, lnF, ln g PR, and lnW. We start in
row (1) with the baseline simulation labeled \Benchmark." As described above, the foreign
input cost shock in this simulation generates an the increase in manufacturing sector's 
from 0.83 to 0.89 and generates a decline in manufacturing productivity, lnPR, of 4.8
percent. If we take into account the mis-measurement due to ignoring the 8.8 percentage
point increase in import bundle prices due to dropped varieties the magnitude of the mis-
measured productivity, ln g PR, decline is 5.8 percent. The reduction in welfare, lnW,
which as shown in equation (6) additionally incorporates the decline in terms of trade, equals
8.6 percent.
lnPR lnF ln g PR lnW
(1) Benchmark -0.048 0.088 -0.058 -0.086
(2) No Fixed Costs, Same lnpm -0.041 0.000 -0.041 -0.065
(3) No Fixed Costs, Same ln -0.058 0.000 -0.058 -0.095
(4) Adjusting For Inventories -0.022 0.034 -0.027 -0.037
(5) No Capital Goods -0.030 0.048 -0.037 -0.052
(6) No Roundabout Production, Same lnpm -0.017 0.119 -0.029 -0.060
(7) No Roundabout Production, Same ln -0.015 0.082 -0.025 -0.045
(8)  = 0:50 -0.146 0.107 -0.158 -0.254
(9)  = 0:90 -0.031 0.031 -0.032 -0.085
(10)  = 0:50,  = 0:90 -0.141 0.051 -0.143 -0.302
Table 6: Simulation Results: Productivity and Welfare
We now compare the productivity estimates in the benchmark simulation to those that
would be obtained if we had designed our model to match the aggregate data. Recall that
the aggregate data implied no signicant product extensive margin. In our environment,
a lack of extensive margin is consistent with the removal of input variety xed costs. We
41therefore perform two exercises: We evaluate the model under the assumption of no xed
costs but (i) when hit with the same size import price shock lnpm as in the benchmark
case and (ii) when we calibrate the shock to generate the same movement in import shares
ln as in the benchmark case. Case (i) is the relevant exercise if one is trying to forecast
the impact on productivity of a given shock to the economy, while Case (ii) is the relevant
exercise for an ex post analysis. In both cases, the impact on productivity and welfare are
meaningfully dierent from the benchmark.
The simulation results for the rst case are reported in row (2) of Table 6 and for the
second case are reported in row (3). In both simulations, all adjustments take place via
the intensive margin. As a result, rms are able to accommodate higher import prices with
smaller shifts in shares of imported versus domestic inputs { all of the losses are associated
with less import volumes and none are associated with less import varieties. Further, there
is no savings of labor associated with declines in xed costs in either case. These two eects
combine to result in productivity declines on the order of one percentage point less and
one percentage point more than in the benchmark case.42 Welfare declines without xed
costs dier from those measured in our benchmark case by up to two percentage points.
These meaningful dierences corroborate the importance of using rm-level evidence on the
product sub-extensive margin to select the appropriate model.
5.7 Robustness
In this sub-section, we re-simulate our system with a number of dierent parameter values or
assumptions used in our empirical analysis to determine the sensitivity of our productivity
and welfare estimates. The results are reported in rows (4)-(10) of Table 6.
As shown in Figure 8, the Argentine rms in industries which appear to hold the least
inventories relative to their sales reduced their imports by signicantly less than typical
rms. If we re-calculate the value in the 2002 Argentine data of the aggregate share of
input spending on domestic goods  under the assumption that aggregate import growth is
scaled down to match the experience of these least inventory intensive sectors, we obtain the
42To match the same movement in , in the absence of the sub-extensive margin, requires a bigger shock
which is why the impact on productivity exceeds that of the benchmark case.
42value post = 0:86 rather than the baseline post-crisis value of 0.89. We therefore introduce
a simulated decline in the import price of a magnitude that generates this more limited
movement in . Row (4) reports that this produces a productivity decline that is roughly
half as large as that seen in the benchmark case but which is still economically signicant.43
Relatedly, row (5) considers a shock that is calibrated to the change in  found in the data
when we exclude import spending on capital goods. This implies a value for post equal to
0.87 and a productivity decline of 3 percentage points.
Next, we consider the impact of eliminating roundabout production by specifying that
the price of domestic inputs PZ is xed at its initial value from the baseline simulation and
is completely insensitive to changes in the import price pm. Row (6) reports results from a
simulation in which we set lnpm equal to the movement in the baseline simulation and
row (7) reports results from a simulation in which we instead shock import prices to match
the baseline movement in . As expected, this also reduces the impact of the shock, but the
declines in productivity and welfare both remain economically signicant.
Rows (8) through (10) show the results if we consider varying values for the key elasticity
parameters  and . We adjust the initial import price pm to match the initial aggregate
import share and continue to adjust pm in order to match the baseline movement in  over the
crisis. Feenstra, Obstfeld, and Russ (2010), in a model with very similar structure to ours,
emphasize estimates suggesting  < . We consider this possibility by simulating the model
with  = 0:5, corresponding to an elasticity between domestic and foreign varieties of 2. This
produces large productivity declines, shown in row (8), approaching 15 percent. Row (9)
shows that productivity declines by about 3 percent if we increase  to 0.90, corresponding to
a high elasticity within domestic and within foreign varieties of 10. Row (10) shows that the
combination of making the between-elasticity lower and the within-elasticity higher yields
43It is important to note that since inventory adjustments are not costless, adjustments in inventory will
have an independent negative impact on welfare and productivity. Just as with imports, rms maintain
an optimal level of inventories given input prices and inventory costs. The imported input cost shock will
lead the rm to optimally adjust its imports and inventories and in an environment where output is sub-
optimally low, because of mark-ups, this has productivity and welfare aects. That is, even if all of the
dropped import varieties continued to be used in production, the fact that the rm had to shift from imports
to running down inventories can raise the eective unit cost of production and have negative productivity
aects. Without explicitly modeling inventories it would not be clear what the quantitative implications are
of rms switching from imports to inventories for their production. Given this, we view our robustness check
as fairly conservative.
43productivity declines of about 14 percent.
In sum, our simulations conrm that the mechanisms motivated in the empirical analyses
of Section 3 and analyzed in the model of Section 4 are of rst-order quantitative signi-
cance to the declines in manufacturing productivity and welfare witnessed in large crises and
current account reversals.
6 The Decline and Recovery of TFP in Argentina
We have demonstrated how aggregate productivity and welfare can decline as rms substitute
from imported to domestic input use. The shift in spending toward domestic sources is
captured by movement in , while the importance of dropped import varieties for raising
rm unit costs is captured by F. In this section we correlate our measures of changes in 
and F with independent estimates of total factor productivity (TFP) for Argentina. These
independent TFP estimates dier slightly from the welfare-relevant measure of productivity
we use in this paper, but the basic time-series properties of these should be similar. We
show that the chronology of our  and F measures is consistent with the chronology of TFP
movements, both during the period when TFP declined and when it recovered.
Figure 13 includes plots of two estimates of productivity in Argentina as measured by
ARKLEMS, an Argentine project that measures productivity following the methodology
of the WORLD KLEMS initiative and of Coremberg (2009). The solid black line plots
\unadjusted" TFP, which the author says corresponds to the typical methodology used in
Argentine and Latin American TFP estimation as well as by other studies such as Kydland
and Zarazaga (2002). The blue dashed line plots what they label \strict" TFP, which includes
adjustments of labor quality and capital utilization.44 We should point out that the adjusted
TFP measure is done with limited data and restrictive assumptions and may therefore be
less reliable.
Both TFP series are normalized to equal 1 in 2000 and indicate that TFP began to decline
44We do not plot the TFP measures from Sandleris and Wright (2011) here as those estimates end in
2002. Our results are consistent with their estimate from continuing establishments, the relevant comparison
group for us because all of the adjustment in trade takes place within continuing rms. This measure of
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Figure 13: Time-series Paths of Productivity, Dropped Varieties, Import Shares
in 1999. The unadjusted series exhibits moderate to large declines through 2001, with its
largest decline occurring in 2002. A rapid recovery of this measure of TFP then begins in
2003. The adjusted series declines more modestly in 2002 and continues this decline in 2003
before exhibiting a more mild recovery in 2004 and 2005. The unadjusted TFP series nishes
2006 (the last available ARKLEMS estimate) only slightly below its pre-recession level while
the adjusted series remains depressed.
The long-dashed green line plots our estimates of (1 ), the share of imported inputs in
total input spending. The decline in (1   ) from a peak of 0.17 to the trough value of 0.11
corresponds to the values in Table 5 of pre = 0:83 and post = 0:89. Though much of the
substitution away from imported inputs occurs in very late 2001 and 2002 due to movement
in the exchange rate, this substitution in fact started as early as 1999. This is consistent
with our model because in the presence of xed costs of importing, rms will spend less on
45imported inputs as total demand declines, even holding xed the relative price of imports.
The series stabilizes in 2003 and then recovers starting in 2004.45
The short-dashed red line plots our estimates of the impact of dropped import varieties
on the unit cost of production F using the same methodology as those done in Table 4.
We consider idiosyncratic rm-specic changes in the cost of imported inputs in each year
relative to the base year of 2000 due to changes in the mix of 10-digit inputs by country
of origin. This series has a small decline in 2001, a larger decline in 2002, and a recovery
starting in 2003.46 The time variation in F therefore displays a positive correlation with that
of TFP.
While clearly there were many other negative shocks during the Argentine crisis, the
time-series patterns do oer corroboration that the mechanisms highlighted in our paper
may well have been salient for TFP in Argentina over this period.
7 Conclusion
Two prominent features of large macroeconomic crises are the collapse in imports and the
large decline in measured TFP. We use transaction-level trade data from the Argentine crisis
of 2001{2002 to characterize, mechanically, how this reduction in trade occurred and how
the decline inuences a welfare-relevant measure of productivity. We nd that the extensive
margin of trade at the country level, where previous importers stop importing or product
varieties are dropped by all importers, is not quantitatively signicant. However, the micro-
data allow us to observe quantitatively signicant within-rm churning of inputs that we
call the sub-extensive margin. Finally, the scale and type of trade adjustment diers with
the size of the importer, generating heterogeneous changes in their unit costs of production.
Motivated by these empirical ndings, we build a heterogeneous rm model with round-
45Calculation of the imported input share in this plot diers slightly from the methodology described in
Section 5.3 because we need data for years for which annual manufacturing censuses are not available. We
therefore use data from the World Bank's World Development Indicators to compare growth in manufacturing
spending on imports to growth in manufacturing value added, rather than total input spending, in order
to grow the earlier series forward. This implicitly assumes that, as in the model, the ratio of spending on
inputs to the sector's value added remains constant. We compared estimates of  for 1998-2003 using this
new methodology to estimates using that described in Section 5.3 and found them to be highly similar.
46In fact, this measure also shows a small downward trend from 1998 to 2000, but less condence should
be placed in the 1998 and 1999 values for this measure due to the gap in our data over this period.
46about production and xed costs of importing. The model replicates the above empirical
ndings and generates economically signicant declines in productivity and welfare. When
calibrated to reproduce the lack of extensive margin adjustment observable in aggregate
data, the impact on productivity and welfare diers signicantly.
Crises such as the one Argentina experienced surely involve multiple shocks, and no one
channel can explain its entire economic impact. Our analysis suggests, however, that the
reduced use of imported intermediate inputs is a signicant contributor to the productivity
and welfare losses experienced during crises.
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50Appendices { Not for Publication
Appendix A: Derivation of Equations for Productivity
and Welfare
7.1 Derivation of Equation (6)
Consider the standard problem of a representative consumer who maximizes her welfare:
Wt (Bt;Kt) = max
fGjt;Lt;Bt+1;Kt+1g
[U(fGjtg;Lt) + Wt (Bt+1;Kt+1)];





t Bt+1 + PItKt+1  wtLt + t + r
k
t Kt + P
B
t Bt + r
b
tBt + PIt(1   )Kt:
The consumer is assumed to be a price taker in all markets. The consumer chooses the level
of consumption of each good Gjt produced by sector j and sold at price Pjt; the level of its
savings in one period bonds (Bt+1   Bt) and investment (Kt+1   (1   )Kt): As sources of
income the consumer receives labor income, wtLt; prots t; bond income rb
tBt and capital
income rk
t Kt: Suppose we wish to evaluate the eect of an unanticipated one time fully
transitory shock to this economy. That is the shock aects future welfare only through its
aect on the state variables B and K.
Taking the price of the investment good to be the numeraire, PIt = 1; so that all other
prices are now relative to the price of the investment good, Basu, Pascali, Schiantarelli, and
Serven (2011) and Sandleris and Wright (2011) show that a rst order approximation to the






















(1   ) + r
K K
P V AY V AlnKt +
(1 + r)B
P V AY V AlnBt;
where lnY V A
t is the change in ln real GDP, lnLt is the change in the log of labor inputs,
and lnKt is the change in log of capital inputs. sL = wL
PV AY V AandsK = rkK
PV AY V A are the
shares of labor and capital in value added.
The rst three terms of the right hand side of the equation therefore map the change
in welfare to productivity. This measure of productivity diers from the Solow residual
mainly because the shares of labor and capital do not need to add up to one. In addition
to productivity, welfare is aected by changes in the terms of trade a country faces. This is
given by the next two terms sElnP E
t   sMlnP M
t ; where P E
t is the price of exports and
P M
t is the price of imports (all in terms of the investment good) and sE and sM are ratios of
the value of exports and the value of imports to nominal GDP, respectively. In a dynamic
47We do not show the intermediate steps here because they follow exactly the derivation in the papers
cited. The derivation involves taking a rst order approximation to the Bellman, the budget constraint, the








53environment where trade is not balanced, welfare is also impacted by the change in value of
the stock of assets (capital and bonds), as given by the last three terms in the expression.
In standard trade models such as those examined in Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodriguez-
Clare (2011) trade is balanced, labor is inelastically supplied, and there is no investment.
Without exogenous changes in technology, all changes in welfare can be linked simply to
changes in the terms of trade, which is the focus of their paper. This is no longer the
case when labor is endogenously supplied, when there is investment, and when trade is not
balanced as would be the case in a dynamic environment.
It is not the intention of this paper to perform a full welfare analysis of the impact of
the Argentinean crisis, including the current account reversal, on welfare. What we are
interested in is the impact on productivity and therefore welfare of a particular industry j
that uses imported intermediated inputs for its production during the crisis. A useful feature
of equation (12), as emphasized in Basu, Pascali, Schiantarelli, and Serven (2011) is that the
contribution of a single industry to welfare can be summarized by changes in its productivity
and changes in its terms of trade. We exploit this feature because our analysis involves the
study of a single sector. Since the industry we consider only imports and does not export
its contribution to the change in welfare is then given by equation (6) in the paper.
7.2 Derivation of Equation (7)
The derivation is very similar to Basu and Fernald (2002) with the distinction that we have
labor that is used in xed costs. The production function for each rm is given by equation
(3). Since rms are price takers in the primary factor and intermediate input markets and



































X is the revenue share of intermediates, sY
X =
PXiXi
PiYi ; which is equal to the constant















































Li. Rearranging, we get:
lnY
V A


























Finally, dene the welfare relevant rm-level productivity using the modied Solow Residual:
lnPRit = lnY
V A
i   sk;ilnKi   sl;ilnLi
= lnY
V A
i   sk;ilnKi   sl;i!LplnL
P
i   sl;i (1   !Lp)lnL
F
i :
Substituting for lnY V A
i , we arrive immediately at equation (7).
7.3 Derivation of Expressions (8)-(11)
We present the derivation in the following steps:
Step 1: We express lnXi   lnYi as a function of i. It follows from equations (4),
(5), and pi = Ci=, given xed w and r, that:
lnXi   lnYi = lnpi   lnPXi = (   1)lnPXi:

































































































55where  = (1   )1  ((1   )1 )






























Step 2: The rms decision for use of LF is related to its decision on 
: The rm
maximizes:
e i = i   wL
F
= (1   )PiYi   wL
F;
subject to:

























































which gives the following expressions:
lni = ln(1   ) +

   1
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 1(1   )PiYi(1   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=
(1   )(1   )








(1   )(1   )
 1(1   )(1   i)
:
As i and  increase, so does the share of labor that is used for production. This is used to
arrive at the expression for !LP
i :










 1(1   )(1   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 1(1   )(1   i) + (1   )(1   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 1(1   )(1   i) + (1   )(1   )
(1   )
;
sli (1   !lp)lnL
F =






















ln(1   i)   lnpm

:
Step 4: Replace the expression for lnPXi from equation (13) in the preceding equa-
tion. Replacing the above terms in the expression for rm-level productivity, equation (7),
and aggregating over all i using rm value-added shares !i, we arrive at an expression for
aggregate productivity.
The last step is to relate changes in lnQ to changes in !i and i. We start with an
expression for the value-added weights (which should relate market shares of each rm to











































































given lnAi = 0.
The nal expressions (8)-(11) are arrived at through substitution and regrouping these
terms and using the approximation ln(1   i) =  
i
1 ilni, which is valid for small
shocks. In the simulation section we do not use this approximation because we study large
shocks.
Appendix B: Numerical Algorithm
The algorithm works as follows. Firms start with an initial assumption about the prices
of the domestic input bundle P 0
Z and the nal good P 0
G. Since the importing behavior of
each rm determines its marginal cost and thereby inuences PZ and PG, this assumption is
eectively equivalent to taking as given all other rms' importing decisions. Holding these
price aggregates xed, each rm i simultaneously chooses the optimal number of imported
varieties j
1
ij.48 With this new set of import variety choices f
1
ig, we must solve a xed
point problem to nd a consistent set of new prices fp1
ig because each rm's marginal cost is















































for all rms i until the set of prices fp1
ig is consistent with the domestic input price index
P 1
Z and with all rms' choices of imported varieties f
1
ig. We then repeat this algorithm,
with rms taking as given the price indices P 1
Z and P 1
G; and generate a new set of prices
and import varieties fp2
i;
2
ig and price indices fP 2
Z;P 2

















up to a very small tolerance.
48Though our rms have nite market shares, they ignore the impact of their own price changes on the
aggregate price index. This is not problematic because the largest rm in our baseline calibration has a
market share of only 5 percent.
58Appendix C: Comparative Statics of the Firm's Trade
Response
In this appendix, we evaluate how each rm's response to the terms of trade shock will dier
based on its pre-shock level of total imports. The intent here is to derive an expression that
provides some intuition for the results in the text and as such we do not provide a formal
proof. We have shown that as long as  is suciently high, the number of imported varieties
is increasing in the rm's exogenous technology Ai: Given their relative cost advantage, rms
with higher Ai have lower prices pi and consequently sell more and have higher Yi. These
are also the rms with the lowest i (since PMi=PZ is lower) and the highest Mi:
The elasticity of the response in i to the import price change is a function of the initial
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For the second order conditions for an interior solution to 
i to hold, the denominator must
satisfy











> 0. As long as the numerator is negative and
@ lnPZ
@ lnpm < 1
(which is not always the case), rms increase the share spent on domestic inputs, i, when

































As long as the parameters are such that
@ lnPZ
@ lnpm < 1 and
@ ln
i







=@i, which measures how the elasticity of the sub-extensive margin






=@i > 0, indicating that the elasticity of the sub-extensive





=@i < 0, implying that
larger importers will change their import share by a greater percentage following an import






=@i < 0, then the net eect depends on whether
the direct eect of a lower  on raising the percent change in  exceeds the indirect eect
that raises the relative price of the optimal import bundle relative to domestic inputs by
less.

























































@ lnpm and @ ln e D
@ lnpm do not vary with i. As long as
@ lnPZ
@ lnpm < 1 and  is suciently large, the







is positive or negative.
60Importer Name Primary Industry Primary Ave. Ann. Share of Share of
Sector Imports Imports, Imports,
($Millions) 2000 2002
1 Volkswagen Arg. Auto Mfg. Cons. Disc. 544.5 1.6 0.9
2 Ford Arg. Auto Mfg. Cons. Disc. 508.2 2.0 2.1
3 General Motors de Arg. Auto Mfg. Cons. Disc. 375.7 1.2 2.3
4 Renault Arg. Auto Mfg. Cons. Disc. 368.4 2.3 1.0
5 Peugeot Citroen Arg. Auto Mfg. Cons. Disc. 308.6 1.5 1.0
6 Daimler Chrysler Arg. Auto Mfg. Cons. Disc. 287.3 1.4 0.2
7 Siderar Steel Materials 288.8 0.8 1.9
8 Fiat Auto Arg. Auto Mfg. Cons. Disc. 242.1 0.6 0.5
9 YPF Int. Oil & Gas Energy 236.1 0.4 0.8
10 C.T.I. Wireless Telecom. Telecom. Svcs. 210.1 0.2 0.1
11 Telefonica Comm. Per. Integrated Telecom. Telecom. Svcs. 189.0 1.2 0.0
12 Monsanto Arg. Agr. Chems. Cons. Stpls. 176.5 0.9 2.0
13 Hewlett-Packard Arg. Tech. Distrib. IT 172.1 0.9 0.3
14 Toyota Arg. Auto Mfg. Cons. Disc. 169.6 0.6 0.7
15 Telecom Personal Wireless Telecom. Telecom. Svcs. 165.6 0.8 0.0
16 Petrobras Energia Int. Oil & Gas Energy 156.4 0.1 0.5
17 Aluar Aluminio Arg. Aluminum Materials 138.4 0.6 1.0
18 Acindar Ind. Arg. de Aceros Steel Materials 129.9 0.3 0.9
19 Shell Co. Arg. De Petroleo Oil & Gas Explo. Energy 120.6 0.7 1.0
20 Industrias John Deere Arg. Const & Farm Mach. Industrials 112.1 0.2 0.2
21 Esso Petrolera Arg. Oil & Gas Explo. Energy 103.5 1.1 0.5
22 Siderca Building Products Industrials 102.3 0.3 0.6
23 Bayer Arg. Pharmaceuticals Healthcare 97.4 0.4 0.8
24 Honda Motor De Arg. Auto Mfg. Cons. Disc. 92.4 0.2 0.1
25 BGH Household Apps. Cons. Disc. 92.0 0.4 0.2
26 Siemens Arg. Elect. Equip. & Inst. IT 91.6 0.6 0.2
27 Scania Arg. Auto Mfg. Cons. Disc. 91.5 0.4 0.3
28 Productos Roche Pharmaceuticals Healthcare 89.5 0.5 0.8
29 Atanor Comm. Chems. Materials 88.9 0.2 0.4
30 Co. de Radiocom. Mobil. Wireless Telecom. Telecom. Svcs. 87.2 1.1 0.1
31 IBM Arg. IT Consulting IT 83.7 0.5 0.4
32 Syngenta Agro Agr. Chems. Materials 82.7 0.1 0.4
33 Alta Plastica Distributors Cons. Disc. 76.8 0.4 0.3
34 Iveco Arg. Auto Mfg. Cons. Disc. 75.7 0.2 0.1
35 BASF Arg. Commodity Chems. Materials 73.9 0.3 0.5
36 Pirelli Neumaticos Tires & Rubber Cons. Disc. 73.7 0.2 0.6
37 Minera Alumbrera Limited Gold Materials 73.6 0.2 0.8
38 Unilever De Arg. Household Prods. Cons. Disc. 72.9 0.3 0.6
39 Tetra Pak Pkgd. Foods/Meats Cons. Stpls. 70.7 0.4 0.7
40 Novartis Arg. Pharmaceuticals Healthcare 67.5 0.4 0.4
41 Philips Arg. Tech. Distrib. IT 66.7 0.3 0.2
42 Procter & Gamble Arg. Household Prods. Cons. Disc. 67.6 0.2 0.3
43 Abbott Laboratories Arg. Pharmaceuticals Healthcare 65.8 0.4 0.7
44 Voridian Arg. Commod. Chems. Materials 65.0 0.2 0.8
45 Bridgestone Firestone Arg. Auto Parts & Equip. Cons. Disc. 62.0 0.2 0.4
46 Nidera Food Distributors Cons. Stpls.fs 63.2 0.2 0.3
47 AGCO Arg. Const. & Farm Mach. Industrials 61.8 0.1 0.1
48 Sipar Aceros Steel Materials 60.8 0.1 0.2
49 Aerolineas Arg. Airlines Industrials 60.3 0.7 0.2
50 Dow Quimica Arg. Comm. Chems. Materials 59.1 0.2 0.4
Table 7: Argentina's 50 Largest Importers
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